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Implementation of Congressional 
Intent: A Study of Amnesty Policy 
and the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service 
William Arp, III* and Sherrie L. Baver** 
In 1990, the United States Border Patrol arrested approximately one 
million illegals (Dillin, 1990). Significant as this number may seem, it 
parallels the rate of arrest that existed prior to the passage of the 
Immigration and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA). This phenomenon sug- 
gests that the Act has failed to accomplish one of its primary objectives: 
to control illegal immigration to the United States. 
The IRCA represented the first major change in US immigration policy 
in twenty-two years. In seeking to prevent illegal entry and to gain 
control over the undocumented population already in the country, it 
contained two key provisions. First, it sanctioned fines, prison terms, or 
both, against employers who knowingly hire illegal aliens. The intent of 
Congress was clear: to use employer sanctions to reduce the “pull” or 
attractiveness of American jobs to aliens contemplating illegal entry into 
the country. 
Second, it granted “amnesty”, or temporary residence status, to all illegal 
aliens who could prove that their residency began prior to 1 January 
1982. Proof of residency required documentation and a general know- 
ledge of the requirements for eligibility. Prior to the passage of IRCA, 
the House Judiciary Committee (1 98 1) stated that amnesty would satisfy 
the major goal sought especially by organized labour: “to remove illegal 
population that adversely impacts the economic structure of American 
society.” Thus, the US Congress sought to protect the jobs of US citizens 
by adjusting the residency status of persons who had resided illegally in 
the United States for several years, and by removing the incentive for 
employers to profit unduly fiom the practice of hiring undocumented 
workers at lower wages. 
* Department of Political Science, Louisiana State University, USA. 
**Department of Latin American and Hispanic Caribbean Studies, City College ofNew 
York, USA. 
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Colbert Rhodes’ study on amnesty (1 986) established a credible list of 
problems associated with government attempts to deport undocumented 
persons: 
- lack of means for deportation of illegal aliens back to the country 
of origin; 
- massive deportation may appear inhumane to the rest of the 
world; 
- deportation may cause economic hardship for the receiving 
country; 
- cheap and tractable labour can be a desirable commodity; and 
- political pressure from established ethnic groups within the coun- 
try will seek adjustment of status for illegal co-ethnics through 
legislation. 
It is likely that the inclusion of amnesty within IRCA was designed to 
counter the problems suggested by Rhodes while appeasing immigrants’ 
rights advocates, especially in the Hispanic community, who opposed 
employer sanction features of the bill. 
In general, amnesties are not policies particularly favoured by citizens, 
and the 1986 amnesty faced strident challenges. Opponents of congres- 
sional consideration of amnesty argued that it would: 
- take jobs away from blacks, Hispanics and youth; 
- reward those who broke the law while denying foreign students 
and temporary workers (who entered legally) the right to remain 
in the country; 
- deny government-subsidized benefits (e.g. medical assistance) to 
illegal persons who had secured temporary residency status and 
who were paying taxes; and 
- create a demand for fraudulent documentation (The House Judi- 
ciary Subcommittee Report, 197 1-72). 
Nevertheless, in order to satisfy labour interests, Congress included the 
amnesty provision in the 1986 law and selected the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) to operationalize IRCA and its major 
components - employer sanctions and amnesty. The present study 
targets the implementation process of IRCA as it impacted on amnesty 
and seeks to address the general question, “Could INS implementation 
have been more effective?” The more specific question is: “Did INS 
regulatory interpretations of IRCA and subsequent procedures serve to 
(a) exacerbate an already confusing programme and (b) distort the intent 
of Congress?’ 
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IMPLEMENTATION THEORY 
Implementation of a law is a process fiaught with obstacles. Successful 
implementation of any policy can be measured only insofar as it corres- 
ponds to the “actual” intent of Congress. In this context, implementation 
as a part of the policymaking process may be seen as a product of “intent 
and action” (Rein and Rabinowitz, 1978). The actual implementation 
of IRCA may therefore be seen as a process literally searching for 
“balance” between written policy and the procedures that must be 
developed to bring about desired results. 
Theoretical policy explanations generally criticize either the vague and 
ambiguous designs in the law made by legislators or the lack of resources 
provided to INS as the implementing agency (Edwards, 1980; Nakamura 
and Smallwood, 1980; Palumbo, 1988; 1994). But for implementation to 
proceed effectively, implementors must not only have resources and the 
ability to use them, they must also desire to carry out the policy mandate 
(Sharkansky, 1970; Ingram and Mann. 1980). This study suggests that 
INS as implementors did not favour the goals of IRCA and therefore 
sought not to carry out the intentions of Congress by employing a 
policymaking strategy known as “nondecisionmaking.” 
Nondecisionmaking encompasses actions by individuals, groups and 
even implementing agencies, that are intended to redefine, manipulate, 
suffocate or kill agreed policy goals in order to negate their impact 
(Bachrach and Baratz, 1962; Di Nitto and Dye, 1987). According to 
Frohock (1979), “the two key ingredients of a nondecision are present if 
reform fails: (1) the idea of what might have been, and (2) the explana- 
tion of the failure to reach it as the absence of needed decisions.” The 
technique of nondecisionmaking is exercised by dominant groups such 
as INS, who possess, control and manipulate vast economic resources. It 
is also suggested by Frohock (1 979) that those who have the resources 
and power can also obstruct reform “simply by doing nothing.” 
As a powerful organization controlling vast resources, developing the 
guidelines for amnesty eligibility, and as the sole implementor of IRCA, 
INS possessed the ability to engage in nondecisionmaking activity 
(Bachrach and Baratz, 1970). We suggest that INS may have ignored 
known realities associated with illegal aliens and should have informed 
and thus dictated the development of implementing guidelines and 
requirements that would fulfil the legislative intent of the US Congress’ 
amnesty programme. 
Our theoretical premise is that the intent of a legislative measure is often 
transformed by implementation procedures utilized to define and acti- 
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vate it within US society. The US government, via IRCA, sought to gain 
control over the illegal population residing in the country by legalizing 
the status of some through amnesty and forcing the ineligible residents to 
leave. Clearly, the US Congress was trying to serve two “Masters”: the 
American labourer who wanted illegals thrown out of the country, and 
conversely the owners of businesses who needed the cheap and tractable 
labour provided by illegal residents. INS’ purpose was to implement the 
preceding balanced objectives thereby satisfymg the legislated intent of 
Congress. 
METHODOLOGY 
This study provides a structural analysis of the implementing procedures 
employed by INS and their attempt to implement congressional intent. 
The roles of Qualified Designated Entities (QDEs) are explained and the 
results of interviews completed with their directors in Arizona and New 
York provide unique perspectives on IRCA’s implementation pro- 
cedures. The Arizona and New York studies represent separate and 
independent surveys which provide the perspective of illegal workers 
regarding eligibility criteria used by INS to legalize their status. The 
collective successes and difficulties experienced by illegal aliens also 
provide data on the appropriateness and feasibility of INS implementa- 
tion guidelines and procedures. 
Community-based organizations in Arizona and New York became INS 
certified QDEs. These operated under a cooperative agreement with INS 
to process illegal workers and their applications for legalization of 
status. Generally, QDEs are considered trustworthy by the illegal resi- 
dent population because they are well-established within the community 
and offer assistance in a relatively risk-fkee environment. 
Arizona study 
In April 1988, we asked all 26 QDEs registered by INS in Arizona to 
participate in a study which sought to measure the impact of IRCA. Nine 
QDEs responded aflimatively but follow-ups with the others were 
unsuccessful. Later contact with participating QDEs revealed that only 
12 QDEs within Arizona remained functional towards the end of the 
amnesty programme. During the first phase of the survey, data were 
successfully solicited from 9 of the 12 QDEs still functioning. 
QDEs are indigenous community organizations situated within Spanish- 
speaking localities in Maricopa County, Arizona. Historically, they have 
sought to represent the economic and political interests of illegal aliens. 
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Our questionnaire was designed to ascertain the perspectives of the 
QDEs regarding amnesty and to discover those characteristics which 
may have served to constrain, limit or promote the effectiveness of the 
provision of amnesty within IRCA. 
The second phase of the survey required collection of survey data fiom 
the 308 illegal aliens who, as of June, 1988, still resided within Maricopa 
County, even though the deadline for submitting applications for regular 
legalization of status had expired. This survey included both illegal 
residents who failed to complete the application process for legalization 
of their status and those whose applications had been rejected. Respond- 
ents were asked why they failed to come forward and complete the 
application process to upgrade their residency status or why their 
applications had been rejected. The surveys were conducted in Spanish 
and English. 
The third phase focused on Arizona residents who previously had been 
undocumented residents, had completed the application process and 
had received temporary legal residence. Data were collected fiom 
286 temporary legal residents. The areas surveyed in phases two and 
three were Phoenix, Glendale, Queen Creek, Chandler Heights and 
Tolleson. Most respondents were located through the indigenous Latino 
community organizations selected by INS as QDEs. 
Individual-level data collected were subjected to a discriminant analysis. 
Discrimination analysis, as the procedure is also known, identifies 
boundaries between groups of objects. The analysis pinpointed variables 
which limited, constrained or prevented participation of illegal aliens in 
the amnesty programme. 
New York study 
Data for the New York study were collected in two ways. First, informa- 
tion fiom the QDEs was collected between 1987 and 1989 through 
participation-observation at meetings of the Mayor’s Immigration Ad- 
visory Committee and later at meetings of the Office of Immigrant 
Affairs Advisory Committee. Second, a survey was conducted in the 
Summer of 1989 involving 171 amnesty applicants attending INS 
certified English and Civic classes. 
Many of the questions replicated those fiom an earlier survey conducted 
in New York for the INS in December 1987. Although the 1989 survey 
covered only those who were successful applicants, it provided insights 
into the problems shared by those who were successful and those who 
were not. 
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IMPLEMENTATION: A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 
Guidelines, resources and disposition of implementors 
Implementation of IRCA was placed solely in the hands of INS; the 
philosophy of implementation embraced by INS is articulated in Section 
115 of the IRCA: 
It is the sense of Congress that - (1) the immigration laws of the United 
States should be enforced vigorously and uniformly, and (2) in the 
enforcement of such laws, the Attorney General shall take due and 
deliberate actions necessary to safeguard the constitutional rights, per- 
sonal safety, and human dignity of United States citizens and aliens. 
At the request of INS, Congress provided implementation phase-in 
provisions for employer sanctions and amnesty. Prior to the develop- 
ment of specific guidelines, INS sought input from voluntary 
organizations and others in the Washington area. Phase 1 of the imple- 
menting process included press conferences and meetings held by INS 
district offices throughout the country. A questionnaire was utilized at 
these meetings to solicit the advice of concerned groups and individuals 
in the development of the agency’s public education efforts. The ques- 
tions attempted to ascertain those parts of the amnesty programme that 
may be confusing to applicants, the fears applicants may have regarding 
the amnesty programme, and how INS could maximize turnout of 
applicants. In phase 2, INS drafted regulations, issued contracts for 
QDEs services and acquired equipment and materials for amnesty 
offices. In phase 3, the proposed regulations were distributed to select 
groups for their comments. 
The law provided for temporary residency status for illegal aliens who 
could prove that they had entered the United States before 1 January 
1982, and had thereafter lived in the US continuously except for an 
occasional short absence. Further requirements under the amnesty pro- 
vision were: 
- applications had to be made within a 12-month period beginning 
5 May 1987; 
- the applicant had not been convicted of a felony or more than three 
misdemeanours; 
- if eligible for amnesty, the applicant must register under the 
Military Selective Service Act; 
- the application fee must be paid; 
- the applicant had not participated in acts which harmed others 
because of their race, religion or nationality; and 
- the applicant had undergone a medical examination. 
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The deadline for applying for regular amnesty was 5 May 1988 and the 
guidelines required extensive documentation to determine eligibility. 
It was INS’ intention to be ready to accept applications for amnesty by 
5 May 1987. A concerted effort was made to open more than 100 
amnesty offices nationwide and to have QDEs in place to assist illegals 
in the application process. Although community organizations assisted 
INS to reach its goal on time, they and INS officials anticipated dif- 
ficulties in the implementation of amnesty provisions because of the 
historical enforcement role of INS, a role that had also fostered distrust 
on the part of the very people that INS wanted to reach. It was therefore 
important for INS to stress that the amnesty programme would not be 
used as an enforcement tool or to locate illegal aliens. 
Selected QDEs made a number of suggestions to INS prior to the 
development of implementing guidelines for amnesty, including a 
strong reunification programme for those family members who were 
ineligible for legalization, lessening of documentation, lowering of fees 
and elimination of the requirement to take medical examinations only 
from “selected civil surgeons.” 
This stage of the policy process provides very clear examples of non- 
decisionmaking. The procedures employed by INS supposedly had 
sought to incorporate the views of groups, individuals and especially 
INS-approved QDEs situated within illegal residents’ communities. INS 
had given the appearance of wanting to cooperate with groups represent- 
ing illegal aliens by requesting their comments, suggestions and 
recommendations regarding the establishment of eligibility guidelines 
affecting the implementation of amnesty. However, the predetermined 
implementation philosophy of INS seemed to exclude comments and 
suggestions which could possibly threaten or potentially dilute the 
articulated “intent of Congress” (Carrasco, 1989). 
QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS 
OF QUALIFIED DESIGNATED ENTITIES (QDEs) 
Latino community organizations (INS-appointed QDEs) were surveyed 
to determine their degree of input during the implementation stages of 
IRCA, their perspectives of the eligibility guidelines regulating legaliza- 
tion, and the variables or factors that they considered had served to limit 
or constrain undocumented persons from participating in the legaliza- 
tion provision of IRCA. 
Eight of the nine QDEs surveyed had attempted to actively influence the 
structure of the legalization provision. Some lobbied through their 
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national offices and the Arizona congressional delegation to influence 
the focus of the provision. Others participated in various legislative 
hearings and locally networked with other immigration non-profit agen- 
cies via meetings and legislative feedback. Eight provided INS with 
input and information regarding the proposed development of guidelines 
and regulations, and the Arizona Immigration Steering Committee, 
which included all QDEs in the State of Arizona, met regularly to draft 
responses to INS proposed guidelines. 
QDEs were unanimous in their view that the undocumented workers 
failed to come forward because of the excessive documentation re- 
quired, lack of strong family unification provisions, the financial cost for 
those seeking to legalize their status, and fear of INS. QDEs identified 
major flaws within INS implementation guidelines and philosophy and 
not only warned INS but also cautioned the US Congress (during its 
deliberations) that participation in the amnesty programme would suffer 
if family unification provisions were not strengthened, documentation 
requirements were not relaxed, and eligibility fees were not reduced. 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL DATA - 
ARIZONA 
The dependent variable in this phase of the study is amnesty. The INS 
had the responsibility for determining who would be eligible for tem- 
porary residency status - amnesty- based upon satisfaction of eligibility 
guidelineskompletion of the application process. The dependent vari- 
able in surveys 1 and 2 was labelled “not completing application” and 
“completing application” respectively. “Not completing application” 
was coded “0” and “completing application” was coded “1”. 
Fourteen independent variables were analysed to ascertain those factors 
which may have limited, constrained, eliminated or promoted the oppor- 
tunity for illegal aliens to acquire amnesty. These independent variables 
were also dichotomies, assigned a value of one if checked as a reason for 
difficulty in applying for amnesty and a value of zero if not checked. The 
pertinent independent variables are money, residency, documents, fam- 
ily deportation, agency help, programme (understanding), lose welfare, 
my reasons, farmer, paid in cash, fiom Mexico, sex, age and married. 
Results 
Table 1 (page 439) shows the standardized and unstandardized dis- 
criminant function coefficients. These coefficients were used to obtain a 
discriminant score for the function by multiplying each coefficient by its 
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respective variable value and summing the products plus the constant. 
The resultant score locates the individual case on a continuum represent- 
ing the function. Discriminant scores were computed for each individual 
and then plotted as histograms shown in Figures 2,3 and 4 (pages 442 
and 443), which shows the clustering of individual cases within the two 
known groups. 
Variables in the h c t i o n  represent the concerns of QDEs and serve as 
the foundation for eligibility guidelines established by INS. Table 1 
indicates that variables “Paid in Cash”, being a “Farmer” and under- 
standing the “Programme” were the most significant in discriminating 
between the illegal groups. Of lesser, but still considerable significance 
were the variables “My Reasons”, being able to show “Residency”, 
“Age”, feeling the “Agency Could Help”, and being able to gather work 
“Documents”. Further indication of their importance and rank is the 
positive direction and the greater magnitude of their coefficients. 
Residency is a significant variable with an impressive coefficient of 
.26214. Proof of residency is dependent upon the ability of illegal aliens 
to secure adequate documentation and, in this regard, these two variables 
are interrelated with a coefficient of .52 . 
The second most significant variable was the requirement for excessive 
documentation mandated by INS to apply for amnesty. Considering that 
illegal aliens typically attempted to conceal their identity, they were now 
being asked to reveal their true identity in order to acquire temporary 
resident status and a work permit. Many had to rely on affidavits secured 
through a recent or previous employer. Many employers charged ex- 
orbitant fees, ranging from $25 to $500, for producing an affidavit 
supporting resident requirements (Arp, 1989). Many documents were 
fiaudulent which created an impossible situation for illegal aliens who 
had to obtain affidavits fiom employers. The INS continuously warned 
illegal workers not to use false documents. Detection by INS would 
often result in penalties, including ineligibility to legalize, deportation, 
fines and/or imprisonment. The fee requirement for legalization also 
proved to be a significant variable regarding registration of illegal aliens. 
It is well-documented that foreign workers are usually disadvantaged 
and likely to be employed in low-level, poorly-paying jobs (Briggs, 
1984; Marshall, 1982; North and Houstoun, 1976). This ability to pay 
the required fee was always questionable. Applicants who feared the 
deportation of relatives, loss of welfare benefits and were of the opinion 
that agencies did not help, were less likely to complete the application 
process than applicants who experienced no such difficulties (Arp, 
1990). Illegal aliens who did not understand the programme represented 
the third largest coefficient. 
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Occupations and stability of employment were also major factors affect- 
ing the gathering of needed documentation. Thus, illegal residents 
employed in the secondary labour market (service) therefore had a 
greater opportunity to secure amnesty than did farm workers. In all 
likelihood, instability and seasonality of an occupation were directly 
related to the illegal alien’s ability to secure proof of his or her residency. 
The coefficient “paid in cash” reflects the large percentage of farm 
workers who received payment in this way. The arrangement between 
employer and employee benefited both: the employer made more profit 
and did not have to fear the Internal Revenue Service; the illegal alien did 
not have to prove identification which is required to cash a cheque. 
Married applicants were more likely to complete the application process 
than non-married applicants and females were more likely to complete 
the process than males. Table 1 also shows that the younger the applicant, 
the less likely he or she was to complete the application process. 
Respondents to the survey 2 group, who worked primarily in the 
secondary labour market, experienced fewer problems raising the re- 
quired application fees than did farm workers. Stability of regular 
employment (not included as a variable within this study) appears to have 
only provided the survey 2 group with the required fees and also provided 
them with a more permanent residency than their counterpart. This 
occupational factor serves indirectly to explain differences in the rate of 
completion of the application process for legalization of their status. 
ANALYSIS OF INDMDUAL DATA -NEW YORK 
Amnesty is the dependent variable in this survey of sampled illegal 
aliens who had completed the application process and received tem- 
porary residency status. The intent was to ascertain perceived barriers in 
the application process for amnesty recipients (Table 2, page 440). They 
also were asked why they thought others did not apply for the legaliza- 
tion programme (Table 3, page 440). The explanatory variables are fear 
of INS, lack of documentation; fear of family separation; eligibility; 
confusion caused by INS policy, high application costs, and New York‘s 
informal economy. 
Forty-six per cent of respondents in the New York study indicated that 
they were afiaid of INS. While this cannot be regarded as a valid 
explanation of why others did not apply, it does indicate widespread 
concern about amnesty being used as a means of entrapment. Perhaps 
this fear could have been lessened, but during the first six months, INS 
in New York did not consistently mention the possibility of applying for 
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amnesty through QDEs. Thus while “fear of the INS” per se cannot be 
seen as a major deterrent, indirectly it may have caused potential 
applicants to delay acquiring the necessary documentation. 
The main concern among the New York group of amnesty recipients was 
documentation; 59 per cent considered “having papers” was the key 
determinant of their amnesty status. The second greatest perceived 
barrier was confusion caused by INS implementation. According to 
Coronado Communications (1987), 57 per cent admitted being very or 
somewhat confused by INS directives. 
Fear of family separation was mentioned by 47 per cent of respondents 
as a concern, many having noted that they were the only family member 
in the United States or that all other family members were legal. Not one 
respondent mentioned fear of family separation as a reason why others 
might not have applied. “Eligibility”, or what the Arizona study labelled 
“Residency”, was a concern expressed by 44 per cent of New York’s 
undocumented workers. High fees were also a relatively minor concern 
and when asked why others did not apply, only 2 per cent thought that 
money had been a barrier. The results of this survey confirm the findings 
of North and Portz ( 1988) that too much complexity was associated with 
eligibility requirements. Respondents did not cite fear of INS, concerns 
about family separation or high costs as major factors. 
The New York study examined a non-related INS variable as a potential 
disincentive to apply. Researchers examining New York City’s low 
application rate during the amnesty period hypothesized that because 
large numbers of the city’s illegal alien population worked in ethnic 
business enclaves, they felt safe and sheltered from the threat of em- 
ployer sanctions and, therefore, had little incentive to apply (Meissner 
and Papademetriou, 1988). Ninety-one per cent of applicants surveyed 
disagreed with the use of employer sanctions to force their participation 
in IRCA’s programme. The successhl amnesty applicants in New York 
had a great deal in common with their counterparts in Arizona. The 
variables, Documentation, ResidencyEligibility, and Lack of Under- 
standing of the Programme/Confusion about the Programme indicate 
that illegal residents fiom the East and West shared the same concerns 
regarding INS implementation procedures. 
CONCLUSIONS 
We contended that implementation of a programme was a bureaucratic 
fhction that duplicates and activates legislative intent. INS was chosen 
by the US Congress to carry out the implementation of IRCA and its 
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historical amnesty programme. Our structural analysis of INS proce- 
dures shows that INS symbolically opened its development of eligibility 
procedures to community-based Latino organizations, especially QDEs. 
These organizations disagreed with the stringent requirements proposed 
by INS and advised the agency to require less documentation and proof 
of residency. INS failed to consider their suggestions, although they 
knew that illegal residents usually hid their true identities when residing 
in the United States. 
On the basis of results fiom the Arizona and New York studies, docu- 
mentation was the key to amnesty, and INS understood the regulatory 
effect of requiring extensive documentation. Under INS implementing 
rules, without sufficient or proper documentation, residency could not 
be established for upgrading the status of illegal residents. Proof re- 
quired the submission of documents such as passports, rent receipts, 
utility bills, birth or baptismal records, deeds, census records, police 
records, bank books, school records, telephone receipts, insurance 
records, drivers’ licences, social security cards, separation or divorce 
decrees, and affidavits fiom past and present employers. Some who were 
eligible for the programme did not apply because they could not produce 
the necessary documentation. 
Capacity to pay the required fees for processing applications was another 
barrier placed in the path of illegal residents: $75.00 for basic counsel- 
ling services and $25.00 for photography and fingerprinting assistance; 
additional fees of $185.00 were set per application and a fee of $420 for 
family applications. INS and its officials were aware of the inability of 
many illegal persons to pay these fees. 
Various Hispanic and religious groups, through letters, petitions, tele- 
phone calls, INS implementing conferences, and state officials and 
lobbyists, informed INS of the impracticality of their proposed eligibil- 
ity requirements. The suggestions of community-based organizations, 
which would later become certified QDEs, were ignored or excluded and 
were not reflected in substantive changes made by INS. An overall 
assessment of QDE’s efforts to impact on implementation virtually 
begins and ends with answers provided to INS’ inquiries. Nondecision- 
making emerges as the primary factor defining INS implementation 
procedures. 
Instead of seeking a proper balance between the written words of IRCA 
and the intent of Congress, INS developed guidelines that ignored the 
relevant facts presented by respected QDEs and Latino groups. In 
reality, the role of INS did not change very much. Instead of preventing 
illegal entry along the Mexican border, INS sought to prevent illegal 
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entry through amnesty ofices throughout the United States. The fear 
generated by INS and confirmed by the Arizona and New York studies, 
may be considered a natural reaction for an illegal population. The 
number of illegal aliens who did not come forward as a result of INS’ 
long-standing enforcement image will never be known. 
This study concludes that the eligibility requirements promulgated by 
INS to regulate participation under the amnesty provisions of IRCA 
served to limit and constrain participation in that programme and award 
only those who were narrowly defined by implementing rules and 
procedures. Future studies in this area should focus upon “policy design” 
as a potential variable determining IRCA’s impact on the legislation of 
undocumented residents in the United States. 
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TABLE 1 
DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS 
Variables 
Money 
Residency 
Documents 
Family/Depotl 
Agency help 
Programme 
Lose welfare 
My reasons 
Farmer 
Paid in cash 
From Mexico 
Sex 
Age 
Are you married 
~ 
Unstandardized Func 1 Standardized 
. 1 320420 
5292510 
A400682 
.lo82425 
5758335 
1.109596 
.5444793 
.7757887 
.9946559 
1.4671 83 
.0199669 
.0495274 
.0271612 
3344953 
.06445 
.26214 
.21969 
.04662 
.22049 
.43226 
.21220 
.35697 
.45774 
.59966 
,00594 
.02309 
.24158 
,16286 
CANONICAL DISCRIMANANT FUNCTIONS 
Pct of Cum Canonical' After Wilks' 
Eigenvalue variance Pct Corr *"Lambda Chisquare DF Sig 
9.3571 100.00 100.00 ,7588 .4242 388.273 14 .oooO 
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Very Somewhat 
1. 
Not 
2. 
7. 
I 8. 
Were you afraid of letting 
the INS know you are 
here? 
Were you worried about 
not having proof of 
residency? 
Were you worried about 
family separation? 
Were you worried about 
being eligible? 
Were you worried about 
knowing how to apply? 
Were you confused by 
INS handling of the 
programme? 
Were you worried about 
not having the money to 
apply? 
Do you agree with the 
statement, “It is easy to 
live in New York City 
without being discovered 
so why apply.” 
66 13 (46%) 
77 3 (47%) 
57 18 (44%) 
69 15 (49%) 
82 16 (57%) 
66 9 (44%) 
6 9 (9%) 
92 (54%) 
68 (40%) 
91 (53%) 
96 (56%) 
87 (51%) 
72 (42%) 
95 (55%) 
156 (91%) 
DWNA 
1 Yo 
1 Yo 
1 Yo 
1) Responses of “Very” and “Somewhat” are summed to produce stated percentages. 
2) DK = Don’t know 
NA = Not applicable 
TABLE 3 
WHY ILLEGALS DID NOT APPLY FOR AMNESTY 
Reasons Number of Responses 
1. Fear of INS 97 
2. Lack of documentation 22 
3. Not eligible 18 
4. Apathy 10 
5. Too confusing 7 
6. Lack of money 3 
7. Don’t know 14 
Opinions of illegal residents now approved for amnesty - New York City Survey. 
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FIGURE 1 
Stuart in The Cristian Science Monitor 0 1990 TCSPS 
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FIGURE 2 
DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS: Histogram for Group 1 Survey I 
Canonical Discriminant Function 1 
32 
F 
r 24 
e 
16 
1 
11 1 
11 1 1 
1 11 11 1 1 
1 1111111 1 1 
n 1111111111111 11 
Y 
1111111111111 11 
11111111111111111 
c 8  
1 1111111111111111111111 
1 111111111~11111111111111 X X 
out -4.0 -2.0 .O 2.0 4.0 out 
222222222222222222222222222221 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 Class 
Centroids 
FIGURE 3 
DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS: Histogram for Group 2 Survey II 
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FIGURE 4 
DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS: Allgroups stacked Histogram 
Canonical Discriminant Function 1 
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Actual No. of Predicted Group Group Membership 
Group Cases 1 2 
Group 1 226 190 36 
Survey I 84.1% 15.9% 
Group 2 230 21 209 
Survey II 9.1% 90.9% 
Per cent of "grouped" cases correctly classified: 87.50%. 
Classification Processing Summary 
594 caseswereprocessed. 
0 
138 
456 
cases were excluded for missing or out-of range group codes. 
cases had at least one missing discriminating variable. 
cases were used for printed output. 
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MISE EN OEUVRE DES MESURES VOULUES 
DE LA POLITIQUE D’AMNISTIE ET DES SERVICES 
D’IMMIGRATION ET DE NATURALISATION 
PAR LE CONGRES DES ETATS-UNIS : UNE ETUDE 
La Loi de 1986 sur la rdforme et la rtgulation de l’immigration (Immi- 
gration Reform and Control Act - IRCA) prdsente deux aspects: 
l’amnistie et les sanctions A l’dgard des employeurs. Cette loi doit 
permettre d’avoir sous contrdle la population des immigrants clan- 
destins aux Etats-Unis et d’en fieiner l’accroissement. L’article 
examine, A travers l’analyse de donntes recueillies pour 1’Arizona et 
New York, le r61e de 1’INS dans la mise en oeuvre du volet amnistie de 
1’IRCA. I1 ddmontre que le Service d’immigration et de naturalisation, 
qui a pourtant supervisd le plus vaste programme d’amnistie de 
l’histoire, a, par son interprdtation restrictive des intentions du Congres 
amdricain, exclu ou limitt la possibilitt pour les btndficiaires de 
solliciter et d’obtenir un droit de rdsidence permanent. 
PUESTA EN PRACTICA DE UN INTENT0 DEL CONGRESO: 
UN ESTLJDIO SOBRE LA POLITICA DE AMNISTIA 
Y EL SERVICIO DE INMIGRACION Y NATURALIZACION 
La Ley de Reforma y Control de la Inmigraci6n de 1986 (IRCA) 
comprendia dos caracteristicas claves: la amnistia y las sanciones a 10s 
empleadores. Esta Ley tenia por objeto controlar y fienar el increment0 
de la poblaci6n indocumentada en 10s Estados Unidos. En este articulo 
se examina el papel que desempeiia el Servicio de Inmigraci6n y 
Naturalizaci6n en la puesta en prhctica del aspect0 relacionado con la 
amnistia en la Ley de Reforma y Control de la Inmigracih gracias a 
datos compilados y examinados procedentes de Arizona y Nueva York. 
Los resultados demuestran que si bien el Servicio de Inmigracih y 
Naturalizacibn ha previsto el mayor programa de amnistia de su historia, 
su interpretacibn restrictiva del intento del Congreso de 10s Estados 
Unidos prescribe y limita a 10s beneficiarios que podrian solicitar y 
adquirir la residencia permanente. 
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